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6 August 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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GROUP 1 STATE review(s) completed.

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25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

6 August 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1.	North Vietnam - US: Varied Free World reaction to US air strikes. (Page 1)	
		25X1
3.	Congo: Stanleyville apparently under rebel control. (Page 5)	
4.	Cyprus: Athens concerned about erosion of its influence in Cyprus. (Page 7)	
5.	Notes: OAS-Cuba; India-Pakistan; (Page 8)	25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 August 1964

DAILY BRIEF

*North Vietnam - US: Free World reaction to the US air strikes has ranged from full support from most of the major pro-Western nations to condemnation from some of the neutralist countries. The dominant theme in press and radio commentary has been a general apprehension that the crisis might become more widespread.

In London, strong support for the US action came from Foreign Secretary Butler who backed the right of US warships to defend themselves against "unprovoked aggression" in international waters. Prime Minister Douglas-Home was expected to issue an official statement on the crisis today. The back-America theme ran prominently in both conservative and left-wing dailies.

In Paris, government spokesmen have refrained from comment on any aspect of the crisis, although UN Ambassador Roger Seydoux has officially backed the Soviet call for participation by North Vietnam in Security Council discussions of the incident. President De Gaulle has instructed his Foreign Minister and Ambassador Seydoux to assemble a dossier on the "true facts."

West German officials have expressed their grave concern over the situation while pledging full support for the US. President Johnson's action received unanimous praise in the West German press which described the North Vietnamese attack as a deliberate provocation and the US response "quiet and sober."

(cont'd)

The Italian government has not yet taken an official position but Premier Aldo Moro is reported studying the possibility of including a statement affirming Italian solidarity with the US in today's parliamentary debate on his left-of-center government.

Reaction from other European capitals and Ottawa was sympathetic and understanding.

In the Far East, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Nationalist China, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand have given firm support to the US measures. An official Japanese government statement indicated that a US response was "inevitable." SEATO representatives in Bangkok privately approved the action following a briefing by US representatives. No official reaction has been received from Cambodia, Burma, or Indonesia. However, the leftist press in Cambodia charged the US with provocation and aggression, and Indonesian officials privately displayed serious concern and dismay at the US action. Indian officials expressed "grave concern" prior to attending a special cabinet meeting called to discuss President Johnson's message.

Representatives of most of the African nations were non-committal when presented with the text of the President's statement. However, South Africa's Acting Foreign Secretary assured the US ambassador of his nation's full support. Officials of Dahomey, Sudan, Nigeria, and Nairobi expressed an understanding of the US action. The Ghanaian press strongly condemned US "imperialism" and military involvement in Southeast Asia. Algerian students attempted to demonstrate in front of the US Embassy but were dispersed by the police.

Only two Latin American governments have reacted thus far: high-level spokesmen for the Dominican and Venezuelan governments have expressed their strong sympathy and support for the US position. No reaction has been reported from the Middle East.

6 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

25X1 25X1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

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*Congo: Stanleyville apparently is under rebel control.

Yesterday insurgents were broadcasting from the radio tower at Stanleyville airport, the Congo National Army (ANC) headquarters lost radio contact with the city, and a UN representative in Stanleyville told Leopoldville that the ANC had fled. The US Consulate was attacked, but the occupants so far are not in rebel hands.

If the rebels consolidate, the city's capture will have far reaching consequences. An insurgent regime based in Stanleyville is likely to be declared, Bukavu is almost certain to fall, and Congo National Army (ANC) units throughout the eastern Congo probably will dissolve. Included in the dissolution will be three of the ANC's five least unsatisfactory battalions.

Bukavu's capture would probably be closely followed by an invasion of nearby Hutu-dominated Rwanda by Tutsi refugees who make up a sizable proportion of the rebels surrounding Bukavu. The refugees, now well armed with weapons from the ANC, are eager to reestablish their dominance in Rwanda. Units of the small Rwandan army reportedly are gathering at the border to meet the expected incursion.

The shock of the news from the east is certain to reverberate in Leopoldville, and perhaps cause President Kasavubu to have second thoughts about the advisability of retaining Tshombé as premier. However, it is unlikely for the time being that he will seriously consider an alternative.

To maintain his position, Tshombé reportedly is planning to up his calls for outside assistance. He is likely to try to augment the white mercenaries reportedly slated to lead his gendarmes—now being committed in Katanga—by asking Belgium to provide additional

military advisors. Belgium apparently is willing to respond favorably to this request. Were Tshombé to ask Belgium for troops, however, it is probable that at the present time he would be rebuffed.

It is possible he may ask South Africa and Southern Rhodesia for military assistance.

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Tshombe's chances of containing the rebellions may not be as dark as they currently seem. The rebels continue to be weak and divided, and have been successful so far principally because of the paucity of opposition. It seems unlikely at present that the dissident regime probably to be set up in Stanleyville will have effective control over either its territory or its followers.

25X1

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Cyprus: The Greek Government is concerned over Makarios' drift to the left and the erosion of its influence in Cyprus.

Greek officials are reportedly greatly angered by recent press leaks by Makarios. They evidently feel these leaks have implied that Greece is selling out the Greek Cypriots and they fear that the prospects for enosis have been damaged. The Greeks are also concerned that Makarios will look to local and foreign Communists for support in order to free himself from Athens' influence.

Former EOKA leader George Grivas, recently named commander in chief of the Greek Cypriot forces, flew to Athens yesterday for consultations with Greek leaders. They will probably consider what action should be taken in dealing with Makarios. 7

Athens may now feel that time is not only against Turkey but against Greece as well. Immediate enosis is almost certainly the solution favored by the Greeks. However, Athens does not yet appear willing to make the concessions necessary to gain Turkey's acquiescence in such a solution.

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NOTES

OAS-Cuba: None of the four Latin American countries that still have diplomatic relations with Cuba are likely to break these relations any time soon in compliance with the recent OAS resolution. According to the Bolivian foreign minister, President Paz has decided that Bolivia would not be the first country to take the step. Of the other three, Mexico has publicly stated that it will not break with Havana, Chile will do nothing until after the September elections, and Uruguay has undertaken what will probably be a prolonged 'formal study' of the matter.

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home minister may delay resumption of high-level talks between India and Pakistan. The minister had been scheduled to hold talks with his Indian opposite number before the end of the month as a prelude to a meeting between Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub in September. Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto is reported considering sending an invitation to the new Indian minister of external affairs, Swaran Singh, in an effort to keep the dialogue alive.

25X1

6 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

Approved For Release 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A007800270001-6 25X1

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on 5 August 1964 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

NIE 85-64, 'Situation and Prospects in Cuba."	25X1
NIE 27.2-64, "Prospects for Portugal."	
SNIE 65-64, "Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombé Government in the Congo."	
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25X1

6 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

10

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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